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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act' ("Act") provides copyright
protection for "original works of authorship." The requirement that
the work be original, which very generally means the work must not
have been directly copied from another work but must be the product
of some independent effort on the part of the author, has been thor-
oughly explored by courts2 and commentators 3 and is beyond the
scope of this Comment. What is troublesome about the provision of
copyright protection to "original works of authorship" is the nebulous
requirement of "creativity" which the courts seek in determining
1. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
2. See, ag., L. Batlin & Sons, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976); Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
3. See, ag., M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 2.01 (1988).
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whether a work qualifies as a work of authorship under section 102(a)
and thus is entitled to receive copyright protection.
The need for a standardized amount of creativity to meet the re-
quirement for copyright is not reflected in most applications for copy-
right protection. A work is usually creative enough to be considered a
"work of authorship." The problem due to the lack of a standard be-
comes apparent, however, in the borderline cases in which the creativ-
ity is somewhat trivial, yet does not seem to be entirely lacking. One
such situation may be a simple line drawing of an arrow. This piece
would probably fall under the category of "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works" of section 102(a),4 but it may not embody enough
creativity to constitute a copyrightable work of authorship. Likewise,
a single sentence on a piece of paper may be considered a literary
work,5 yet it may not contain the amount of creativity required to be
considered a work of authorship.
As one court has stated, implicit in the concept of originality is a
"minimal element of creativity."6 This "minimal element," however,
is elusive. This Comment will search for this element. It will seek a
standard against which authors can judge the creativity of their works.
First, it will examine the confusion surrounding the use of the term
"creativity." This Comment will then examine the various approaches
taken by the courts in cases in which creativity is an issue. Finally, it
will attempt to formulate the decisions of the courts into a workable
standard which defines both what creativity is and how much of it is
required in an "original work of authorship."
II. THE SEARCH FOR THE STANDARD
The Act provides no assistance in the determination of how much
creativity is "enough" to meet the minimal requirement or of what
constitutes "creativity." Section 102 does not contain any language in-
dicating that creativity is to be a consideration in extending copyright
protection to works.7 The legislative history of the Act discusses the
4. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1982).
5. Id. at § 102(a)(1).
6. L. Batlin & Sons, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976).
7. Section 102 reads:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in orig-
inal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. Works of authorship include the following
categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
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requirement of originalityS but it also fails to address the idea of crea-
tivity. The Copyright Act of 1909 similarly is void of any mention of
creativity.9
The requirement of creativity does appear in the rules and regula-
tions of the Copyright Office, but only in relation to works of art. The
rules state in part: "In order to be acceptable as a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work, the work must embody some creative authorship in
its delineation or form."'0 Though the rule calls for some creative au-
thorship, it offers no advice or assistance in determining when a work
possesses enough creative authorship or even in determining what
constitutes creative authorship.
While the rules of the Copyright Office do not require a creativity
element for any of the other categories of works of authorship,i1 the
courts have sought this element. Despite a lack of legislative gui-
dance, courts have required works to contain at least a "modicum of
creativity"'12 in order to receive copyright protection. The courts have
not, however, been able to pinpoint the exact amount of creativity
which constitutes a "modicum." One court stated: "There is no simple
way to draw the line between 'some creative authorship' and not
enough creative authorship .... ,,13
To formulate a distinguishable line between "some" creative au-
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of au-
thorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of oper-
ation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it
is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (1982).
8. 'The phrase 'original works of authorship,' which is purposely left undefined, is
intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by
the courts under the present copyright statute." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 102, at 51 (1976).
9. The Act does not even mention a requirement of originality. It merely requires
that the work be the writing of an author "[Tihe works for which copyright may
be secured under this Act shall include all the writings of an author." Copyright
Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076.
10. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1989) (emphasis added).
11. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
12. Universal Athletic Sales v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1975).
13. John Muller & Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer Team, 802 F.2d 989, 990 (8th Cir.
1986).
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thorship and "not enough" creative authorship, one could analyze the
different approaches courts have taken in their attempts to find "some
creative authorship." The analysis would reveal, however, an almost
total lack of ability on the part of the courts to enunciate reasoning for
their findings of creativity or lack thereof which would prove useful in
formulating an understanding of what creativity is or how much of it
is required in addition to originality to render a work eligible for copy-
right protection.
A. Creativity v. Originality
One source of the confusion surrounding creativity may be the lack
of understanding which some courts have of the concept. Though
originality and creativity are separate and distinct requirements, 14 the
courts sometimes are unable to differentiate between the two.
In Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld,15 for example, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals incorrectly used the term "creativity" when
it meant to use "originality." The court was faced with the issue of
potential infringement of a copyrighted work. While focusing on the
amount of originality required to render a work not copied from an-
other similar work and thus not an infringement of the previous work,
the court described the two opposing extremes of "conceded creativ-
ity" and "independent efforts amounting to no more than the
triial."16
In this context, the court actually was discussing the requirement
of originality when it referred to "conceded creativity." According to
Nimmer, "[o]riginality means only that the work owes its origin to the
author, i.e., is independently created, and not copied from other
works."17 The "conceded creativity" which the court described as be-
ing at the other end of the extreme from "trivial independent effort"
would thus be originality. The inability of some courts to distinguish
between the requirements of originality and creativity results in con-
fusing opinions which offer no assistance in understanding the ele-
ment of creativity.
B. The Relationship Between Creativity and Originality
Despite its initial confusion with the term, the Salkeld court did
refer to creativity correctly as it provided a slight definition of the
amount of creativity required for copyright protection. The court de-
14. In an attempt to distinguish between originality and creativity, Nimmer notes
that while originality refers to the nature of the author's contribution to the
work, creativity refers to the nature of the work itself. M. NIMMER, supra note 3,
§ 2.08[B].
15. 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975).
16. Id. at 908.
17. M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.01[A], at 2-8 (emphasis added).
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scribed a reciprocal relationship which seems to exist between creativ-
ity and independent effort or originality. The smaller the amount of
effort involved in a work, the greater the amount of creativity re-
quired. Conversely, a work with a large amount of originality will re-
quire only a small amount of creativity.'8
According to this theory, a simple line drawing could qualify as an
original work of authorship in two ways: (1) if it were so original that
it could reasonably be found not to be a copy of any other work, in
which case only a small amount of creativity would be required, or (2)
if it were very creative, in which case the required amount of original-
ity, or lack of copying from a previous work, would be minimal. Since
simple line drawings are quite common, especially among doodlers,
originality would be a hard element to prove, and most of the draw-
ings would have to illustrate a tremendous amount of creativity to
qualify for protection. For this reason, very few simple drawings
would be found to be "creative enough" to warrant copyright
protection.
Similarly, due to the vast amount of writing already in our lan-
guage, a single sentence would probably lack the amount of originality
sufficient to meet the minimum creativity requirement. Thus, to be
entitled to copyright protection as an original work of authorship, a
sentence would need to reflect such a huge quantity of creativity that
only a minimum amount of originality would be required. Since a sen-
tence could probably not contain such a high degree of creativity and
still have meaning for the reader, it would not qualify as an original
work of authorship for the purposes of copyright protection.
The analysis becomes complicated when the work in question is so
original that only a small amount of creativity is required. The draw-
ing might take on more details. Rather than being a simple line draw-
ing, it becomes an oil painting. The single sentence becomes a
paragraph or a complete story. Now neither so closely resembles com-
mon doodles or familiar phrases. As the works become more original,
or less likely to have been copied from a pre-existing work, the
amount of creativity required theoretically should reduce in inverse
proportion. It is with works in this area that the quantity of creativity
required becomes unclear and unsettled.
C. A Definition
The problem of establishing a standard for creativity is further
frustrated by the absence of a useful definition of creativity. Perhaps
the only legal guidance in defining creativity as an identifiable concept
comes from Nimmer. In discussing the originality requirement for a
work of art, he makes the distinction that, "[w]here creativity refers to
18. Universal Athletic Sales v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1975).
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the nature of the work itself, originality refers to the nature of the
author's contribution to the work."19 This still leaves creativity as a
vague concept as it refers to the "nature of the work," but does not
expand to assist in distinguishing the "nature" of the work from the
actual work itself. Nimmer's explanation basically says that creativity
is not what the author contributes. This provides only slight guidance.
D. Judicial Decisions
In the search for the amount of creativity required 2O or even for a
definition of creativity,2 1 one must thus turn to the courts and analyze
their decisions on the issue. While the decisions of the courts regard-
ing creativity are not necessarily inconsistent or confusing, they are
also not necessarily helpful.
The court in Magic Marketing v. Mailing Services of Pittsburgh22
provided a summary of classes of works which by either judicial or
legislative determination have been found not to exhibit even the min-
imal level of creativity necessary to warrant copyright protection.
This summary provided a foundation for an introduction into judicial
analysis on the issue of creativity.
The summary began with "fragmentary words or phrases" and
"forms of expression dictated solely by functional considerations." 23
The court supported this by citing regulations pursuant to the Act
which list works not subject to copyright: "Words and short phrases
such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere
variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere
listing of ingredients or contents." 24 The court went on to add that
cliched language and expressions communicating an idea which may
only be conveyed in a more or less stereotyped manner are not proper
subjects for copyright.25 Unfortunately, the court did not provide ex-
amples of works of this type.
Next, the court noted that under copyright regulations the listing
of the contents of an envelope or package, like a listing of ingredients,
is not protected.26 Even more colorful descriptions, such as advertis-
ing slogans, are not copyrightable. 27 Finally, the court noted that even
complex directions on packages are not afforded copyright
19. M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.08[B].
20. See supra text accompanying note 16.
21. See supra text accompanying note 17.
22. 634 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
23. Id. at 771.
24. Id. at 772 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1985)).
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1985)).
27. Id.
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protection.28
The above listed works are not proper subjects of copyright be-
cause they have been found to lack the requisite creativity. The ques-
tion remains how much creativity would be required in a work to
enable it to qualify for copyright protection. Courts have taken sev-
eral approaches in their attempts to draw the line between "some cre-
ative authorship" and "not enough creative authorship."
1. Function as Creativity
Some courts, when faced with the issue of creativity, have consid-
ered the function or utility of the work in their analyses. These courts
have generally reached the conclusion that the utility of a work is not
an indication of the amount of creativity that went into producing that
work. In so doing, the courts have slightly expanded the basis laid by
Nimmer in defining creativity29-- creativity is not reflected in the au-
thor's contribution to the work, and it is not reflected in the function
of the work.
In Gardenia Mowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc.,30 the court was
faced with the issue of whether plastic corsages demonstrated the req-
uisite creativity and originality to qualify as copyrightable works of
art. Finding that they did not, the court focused on the addition of
utilitarian features to the corsages in its attempt to identify creativity:
"That degree of creativity necessary to define objects as works of art is
not supplied through innovations which are solely utilitarian or
mechanical."3 ' The court stated that adding practical features to the
component parts of the flower arrangements which simplified their
manufacture did not overcome the "absence of creativity inherent in
the arrangements."32 Similarly, the plaintiff's use of plastic materials
for the fabrication of the flowers may have added utilitarian advan-
tages over natural or cloth flowers, but this did not constitute the crea-
tivity required for copyright protection.33
In Magic Marketing v. Mailing Services of Pittsburgh,34 a different
court examined the relationship between function and creativity in a
work and drew essentially the same conclusion. An issue in the case
was whether envelopes describing their contents with such phrases as
"TELEGRAM," "GIFT CHECK," and "PRIORITY MESSAGE" con-
tained the minimal degree of creativity necessary for copyright protec-
tion. After providing a summary of works found not to be
28. Id.
29. See supra text accompanying note 17.
30. 280 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
31. Id. at 781.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 634 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
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copyrightable, 35 the court held the phrases on the envelopes not to
exhibit the amount of creativity necessary for a work to be subject to
copyright protection. In explaining why a certain phrase was denied
copyright protection, the court reasoned, "The phrase 'CONTENTS
REQUIRE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION' merely exhorts the recipient
to open the envelope immediately upon delivery. It is nothing more
than a direction or instruction for use. As such, it is unprotected."3 6
Though the phrase served a function which made the envelope more
useful, it did not exhibit enough creativity to render the envelope a
work of authorship. The decision in this case thus reaffirms the idea
that adding function or utility to a work will not add creativity to that
work.
2. Decisions Without Analysis
Another approach which courts have used in determining the mini-
mal amount of creativity necessary for copyright protection is to
render a decision without providing any reasoning for that decision.
This approach tends to create more questions than it answers. Unfor-
tunately, even a study of the facts of each case does not offer much
guidance.
The court in Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Manufacturing
Co.37 was faced with the question of whether a decorative screen in-
tended to be used as part of a room divider possessed the minimal de-
gree of creativity required for copyright protection. The design for the
screen was original and consisted of a filigree pattern formed by inter-
cepting straight lines and arc lines.38
The court found the screen with this design to possess at least the
minimal degree of creativity required.39 In explaining its decision, the
court first discussed the requirement of originality. It quoted from dif-
ferent sources which discussed the need for originality, and then it
noted that the originality of the work in question was conceded by the
party opposing the copyright. The court then quoted a long passage
from Justice Holmes on the danger of a court passing on the artistic
merits of a work of art.40 Directly after the quote, the court an-
35. See supra text accompanying notes 22-28.
36. Magic Marketing v. Mailing Services of Pittsburgh, 634 F. Supp. 769, 772 (W.D.
Pa. 1986).
37. 421 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970).
38. Id. at 281.
39. Id. at 282.
40. It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustra-
tions, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one ex-
treme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their
very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned
the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more than
[Vol. 68:835
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nounced that the screens possessed the requisite amount of creativity.
While the court's opinion presents a solid basis for the determina-
tion of originality, it cites to no commentary and offers no discussion
on the idea of creativity. It merely concludes that the works in ques-
tion possess "at least the minimal degree of creativity required"41
without any further explanation. It does not offer guidance as to
when a work possesses the "minimal degree" or as to what constitutes
creativity.
The facts of the case similarly are of little use. The court noted
that the design in question consisted of a "filigree pattern... formed
entirely of intercepting straight lines and arc lines."42 The court did
not describe the amount of complexity of the design; it did not indicate
whether the pattern was made up of two straight lines or twelve
straight lines. It did not describe the pattern of the filigree or indicate
whether the straight lines were parallel or randomly placed or
whether the arcs were concentric or random. The description of a fili-
gree pattern made up of straight lines and arc lines brings to mind a
myriad of images, some intricate and complex and some simple. The
court provided no guidelines for determining which of these images
would contain the "minimal degree of creativity" and which would
not.
Another example of a court finding creativity while raising ques-
tions for those seeking a standard for guidance is Sebastian Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Consumer Contact (PTY) Ltd.43 In this case, the court
found copyrightability in the following example of text from a hair
product package:
Hair stays wet-looking as long as you like. Brushes out to full-bodied dry look.
WET 4 is one step-four choice (finishing) in Sebastian's four step program for
a healthy scalp and head of hair. WET is not oily, won't flake and keeps hair
wet-looking for hours, allowing you to sculpture, contour, wave or curl. It
stays looking wet until it's brushed out. When brushed, hair looks and feels
thicker, extra full. Try brushing partly, leaving some parts wet for a different
loo1k4
doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of
Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time.
At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed
to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the inter-
est of any public, they have a commercial value-it would be bold to say
that they have not an aesthetic and educational value--and the taste of
any public is not to be treated with contempt. It is an ultimate fact for
the moment, whatever may be our hopes for a change. That these pic-
tures had their worth and their success is sufficiently shown by the de-
sire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs' rights.
Id. (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52
(1903)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 281.
43. 664 F. Supp. 909 (D.N.J. 1987).
44. Id. at 913.
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In explaining its decision, the court cited cases indicating that la-
bels are subject to copyright protection providing they manifest the
necessary "modicum of creativity."45 Further, while catch phrases,
mottos, slogans, and short advertising expressions are not copyright-
able, a complete sentence could be subject to protection notwithstand-
ing its length.46 With this foundation for evaluating the presence or
absence of a "modicum of creativity," the court held the text to be
"more than simply a list of ingredients, directions, or a catchy
phrase."47 Thus, "[w]hile the text tries the limits of the modicum of
creativity necessary for a work to be copyrightable," 48 the court found
that the text as a whole came within the purview of the Act.
This "analysis" by the court is troublesome. The court held the
text in question to be "more" than simply a list of ingredients, direc-
tions, or a catchy phrase, none of which are proper subjects of copy-
right protection, but it did not describe exactly what it was about the
text which rendered it "more" than the ineligible works. The court
also noted that the text "tries the limits" of the amount of creativity
necessary for copyright protection, but it did not point to the factor
which pushed it beyond the limit. The length of the text could be a
factor, as could the conversational tone. The different hair styles sug-
gested could render the text "more" than simply directions or could be
the factor which pushed the text over the limit. Thus, in making its
decision as to creativity without providing clear reasoning, the court
confused rather than clarified the requirement of creativity.
3. Deference
A third and quite common approach used by courts faced with the
issue of creativity is to defer to the judgment of the Register of Copy-
right in granting or denying copyright protection based on creativity.
This method, while convenient for the courts, also provides very little
assistance in the determination of how much creativity is enough or
what constitutes creativity.
The court in Atari Games Corp. v. Oman4 9 discussed the rationale
for deferring to the judgment of the Register in cases in which creativ-
ity is an issue. The court had to decide whether the Register had
abused his discretion in denying the plaintiff's application for copy-
right of a video game entitled "BREAKOUT." In deciding the Regis-
ter had not abused his discretion, the court noted: "The question of
whether a particular work reflects a sufficient quantum of creativity
to satisfy the copyright laws is not susceptible to bright line rules or
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 693 F. Supp. 1204 (D.D.C. 1988).
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broad principles." 50 For this reason, and to avoid inconsistent results
among the various courts, the Register is entrusted with determining
whether a work is copyrightable in the first place. In addition, be-
cause the Register must make such informed decisions on a daily basis,
the court's reasoning continued, he is generally recognized to possess
considerable expertise on the matter.51 This leads courts in general to
accord deference to the Register's decisions to refuse or to accept copy-
right registration.
This rationale may be sound, but it does not provide a foundation
upon which to base a determination of the creativity of other works
subject to copyright protection. The facts of the cases also provide lit-
tle guidance in formulating this foundation.
In John Muller & Co. v. N. Y. Arrows Soccer Team,5 2 the court's
deference 'to and analysis of the Register's decision provides little if
any assistance in determining creativity. The work in question in this
case was a soccer team logo which consisted of four angled lines form-
ing an arrow and the word "Arrows" in cursive script below the ar-
row.5 3 The Register found the work lacked the minimal creativity
necessary to support a copyright. 54 The court of appeals affirmed the
decision of the district court to uphold the Register's denial of the
copyright and stated the district court opinion was well reasoned.55 It
did not, however, cite to or quote from the district court's unpublished
opinion or make any attempt to justify its conclusion.
Since the court did not elaborate on the reasoning of the district
court in upholding the decision of the Register, the opinion provides
no guidance in determining the requisite amount of creativity required
for copyright, and must be limited to the plain facts of the case. Ac-
cording to the Register as affirmed by the court, a work consisting of
four angled lines which form a recognizable shape under which is a
word in a cursive script does not contain the required amount of
creativity.
The court did not indicate, however, how far short of the require-
ment the work fell. Perhaps the addition of a single color would have
been sufficient; perhaps it was so void of creativity it would have re-
quired the addition of many artistic details. The lack of reasoning in
the opinion limits the court's decision to the facts of the case.
The court's analysis in Atari Games Corp. v. Oman5 6 provides a
little assistance in formulating a standard. While deferring to the de-
50. Id. at 1205.
51. Id.
52. 802 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1986).
53. Id. at 990.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 693 F. Supp. 1204 (D.D.C. 1988).
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cision of the Register, the court examined the Register's analysis of
the facts in determining creativity. The work in question was a video
game entitled "BREAKOUT." The video display consisted of a rec-
tangular "paddle" directing a "circular ball" into colored rectangular
"bricks." Audio signals indicated when the ball collided with the
other characters.57 The Register found the audiovisual work
presented by Atari did not contain "at least a minimum amount of
original pictorial or graphic authorship, or authorship in sounds," and
thus did not warrant copyright status.5 8 The Register concluded that
the features of the work-common geometric shapes, four bands of
colored rectangles, and three tones heard when the "ball" struck vari-
ous objects on the screen-whether viewed independently or in terms
of the "arrangement of these few items on the screen," did not estab-
lish a basis on which to premise copyright registration.5 9
The court, after stating that this conclusion reflected a reasonable
application of controlling law and copyright regulations,6 0 tried to pro-
vide a basis for the Register's decision. This basis, however, consisted
mainly of quotations from previous cases and commentators without
application of the ideas to the facts of the case. The court's opinion did
not answer the critical question of how much creativity would have
been necessary to have entitled this work to copyright protection.
The court began its analysis by acknowledging the rare instances in
which independent efforts are too trivial or insignificant to support
copyright protection.6 ' It holds true in the context of video games that
a "sequence of images ... might contain so little in the way of particu-
larized form or expression as to be only an abstract idea portrayed in
noncopyrightable form."62 According to the court, the Register appar-
ently concluded that BREAKOUT was one of the cases in which any
expressive value it contained was de minimis and not sufficient for
copyright purposes.
The court noted the Register might reasonably have found the only
ostensibly creative aspect of the game to be the actual idea of the pad-
dle-and-ball game which BREAKOUT represented in video form
rather than its components or their arrangement.6 3 Because copyright
protection does not extend to ideas but to the expression of the ideas,64
the game was thus unprotectable. The game apparently was under-
stood by the Register to be little more than a stock description of a
paddle-and-ball game, inseparable in any principled manner from the
57. Id. at 1207.
58. Id. at 1206.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1206-07.
63. Id. at 1207.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
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idea which it embodied.65
In discussing the creativity necessary in the expression of an idea
in order to merit copyright protection, the court contrasted the
BREAKOUT game with three video games featuring "expressive and
artistically creative renditions of an idea."66 The PAC-ALAN video dis-
play received copyright status because "the expression of the central
figure as a 'gobbler' and the pursuit figures as 'ghost monsters"' dis-
tinguished the video from conceptually similar video games.67 Simi-
larly, the interaction of the characters, obstacles, background, and
music in DONKEY KONG were "arbitrary, fanciful, and sufficiently
distinctive" to warrant copyright protection for that video game.6 8 Fi-
nally, the creative expression portrayed in ASTEROIDS distinguished
it from the generic idea of a space attack game.6 9 With this analysis
the court held the Register could reasonably have concluded BREAK-
OUT lacked the creativity necessary to render the design and config-
uration of the video game display copyrightable.7 0
The analysis in this case does not provide a bright line for deter-
mining when a work contains enough creativity, nor does it offer a
definition for the element. Though it states prior court holdings with-
out applying them directly to the facts of the case, the court in Oman
did add a little more foundation to the element of creativity which
courts seek. Though the expression rather than the idea is the proper
subject of copyright, the court stressed,71 the mere presence of expres-
sion without more is not enough to warrant copyright protection. The
expression must be creative, fanciful, arbitrary, and sufficiently dis-
tinctive. The expression of the idea in BREAKOUT did not possess a
sufficient amount of these qualities to be considered eligible for copy-
right protection.
Examples of artistically creative expression as described by the
court include otherwise generic characters with definite personas and
the fanciful interaction between the elements of the work. The color
and sounds added to the paddle-and-ball idea in BREAKOUT were
not creative enough to render the expression copyrightable. Thus,
though the court did not define artful expression or offer advice on
the amount required, it indicated that the expression of an idea must
contain something more than a basic idea with a few colors and a
sound added.
65. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 693 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (D.D.C 1988).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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This idea is supported by Jon Woods Fashions, Inc. v. Curran,72 a
case affirming the Register's decision to deny copyright protection to a
fabric design consisting of striped cloth over which was superimposed
a grid of 3/16-inch squares.7 3 The Register explained that familiar
symbols or designs, even if distinctively arranged or printed, are not
copyrightable because they lack "at least a certain minimum amount
of original artistic material." 74 Works lacking the minimal amount of
creative authorship are not proper subjects for copyright protection.
The court noted that such works include those which consist of "famil-
iar symbols or designs" or of "a simple combination of two or three
standard symbols such as a circle, a star, and a triangle with minor
linear variations."75
The Register explained that: "[T]he authorship involved in com-
bining the two inch stripes, with the small grid squares superimposed
upon the stripes, is nothing more than formatting type authorship...
which . . . represents nothing more than the product of an un-
copyrightable idea for making this combination."76 The fabric design
lacked the creativity necessary for copyright protection since artistic
expression was not found in the arrangement or combination of the
stripes and grid patterns in the fabric.
Neither the Register nor the court offered any ideas as to what
would have been required to render the work more than the product
of "formatting type authorship." This lack of analysis creates ques-
tions. Perhaps a complex color scheme would have added sufficient
artistic expression to the work; perhaps the design needed to be repre-
sented in various sizes. On the other hand, perhaps the design as envi-
sioned by the artist could never be modified to achieve creativity
without altering the underlying idea to the extent that it no longer
reflected the artist's intent. The court's decision does not provide an
answer to any of these concerns. It only states that familiar symbols
cannot be the subject of copyright, even if uniquely arranged.
The finding of insufficient creativity in the fabric pattern in Jon
Woods, when contrasted with the creativity of the fabric pattern in
Spectravest, Inc. v. Mervyn's, Inc.,77 subtly points to the basis of a line
between insufficient creative expression and sufficient creative ex-
pression. The copyrighted fabric pattern of Spectravest resembled a
jigsaw puzzle using flattened teddy bear shapes as puzzle pieces con-
nected randomly by interlocking lines.78 Though teddy bear shapes
72. 1988 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,264 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 26,265.
76. Id. at 26,264.
77. 673 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
78. Id. at 1488.
[Vol. 68:835
A STANDARD OF CREATIVITY
could be considered "familiar symbols or designs," the arrangement of
which is not subject to copyright protection, the creativity was proba-
bly found in the transformation of the teddy bear shape into puzzle
piece shapes. It would take more artistic thought and ability to design
the "Puzzle Teddy"79 pattern than it would take to superimpose a grid
over a stripe.
Yet, the line is fine between the two patterns. Again, it is unclear
what else would have been necessary to render the stripe design crea-
tive enough. Similarly, it is unclear where the necessary degree of cre-
ativity exists in the teddy bear pattern. Perhaps the idea itself is so
creative that its expression necessarily possesses sufficient artistic ex-
pression. Perhaps the interlocking lines creating the puzzle effect are
quite intricately drawn and reflect painstaking effort. The pattern as
described by the court exhibits creativity, but the degree of creativity
is unclear.
III. THE STANDARD
The few guidelines given by the courts can be combined to create a
basic, though not overly enlightening, standard for the amount of cre-
ativity required for a work to be copyrightable and for what consti-
tutes creativity. The guidelines can be more easily understood by first
formulating a definition of creativity based on what the courts have
decided.
As previously noted,80 Nimmer defines creativity as "the nature of
the work itself." He then further distinguishes it from originality,
which refers to the author's contribution to the work. This nebulous
idea of the "nature of the work" was clarified somewhat by the court
in Atari Games Corp. v. Oman,8 ' which discussed the "minimal artistic
expression" necessary to render a work copyrightable.82 Creativity is
thus reflected in the artistic expression of an idea in a tangible form.
The amount of artistic expression required is more difficult to de-
fine. Courts frequently use terms such as "a modicum"83 and "a mini-
mal degree"8 4 in stating how much creativity is required before a work
is copyrightable. These terms are essentially of no use to someone
looking for a line which can be drawn between enough and not
enough. Yet, a study of the facts of cases in which creativity is an issue
provides a little guidance.
The courts' guidelines can be briefly summarized. A common idea
79. Id.
80. See supra text accompanying note 19.
81. 693 F. Supp. 1204 (D.D.C. 1988). See supra text accompanying note 56.
82. Id. at 1207.
83. See, ag., Universal Athletic Sales v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975).
84. See, e.g., Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.
1970).
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must be expressed in an artistic manner which distinguishes it from
other similar works. Merely adding color and sound to a common
game idea is not enough to render a work copyrightable. 85 Similarly, a
common symbol or design lacks sufficient creativity to be copyright-
able and must be represented in a highly artistic manner to be granted
copyright protection.8 6 These guidelines illustrate the notion that
originality and creativity enjoy a reciprocal relationship.87
IV. CONCLUSION
The requirement of creativity in a copyrightable work of author-
ship is a cloudy concept which raises many concerns. Though it is es-
sentially a judicially created requirement,8 8 the courts are unclear as
to what it is or how much is needed. A person seeking a standard by
which to gauge the creativity of a work of authorship is hard-pressed
to find definite guidelines which actually assist in the determination.
The guidelines which can be gleaned from the cases can be briefly
stated. Basically, courts view creativity as artistic expression. A work
which embodies a common idea, symbol, or design must reflect a mini-
mum level of artistic expression or creativity in order to be subject to
copyright protection.
This is as far as the courts go, though. They offer no principled
means by which to determine if the minimum level has been met and
no sound reasoning for their decisions. In fact, they prefer to defer to
the decisions of the Register of Copyrights in cases where his refusal
to grant copyright protection due to lack of creativity in a work is an
issue.
The search for a standard will continue until the court decisions
can be formalized into useful guidelines or until someone enunciates a
valid test for the required minimum amount of creativity. Until that
time, however, the creativity level of works of authorship will remain
undefined and nebulous, creating confusion for authors seeking copy-
right protection for their works.
Mitzi S. Phalen '90
85. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 693 F. Supp. 1204 (D.D.C. 1988). See supra text ac-
companying note 56.
86. John Muller & Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer Team, 802 F.2d 989 (8th Cir.
1986); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 693 F. Supp. 1204 (D.D.C. 1988); Jon Woods
Fashions, Inc. v. Curran, 1988 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,264 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Spectravest, Inc. v. Mervyn's, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
87. See supra text accompanying note 18.
88. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. The only reference to creativity in
the legislative history of the Act is found in relation to works of art.
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